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Abstract
In an open information systems paradigm, real-time context-awareness
is vital for the success of cooperation, therefore dynamic security attributes
of partners should considered in coalition for avoiding security conflicts.
Furthermore, the cross-boundary asset sharing activities and risks associated
to loss of governance call for a continuous regulation of partners’ behavior,
paying attention to the resource sharing and consuming activities. This pa-
per describes an attribute-based usage control policy shceme compline to
this needs. A concise syntax with EBNF is used to summarize the base
policy model. The semantics of negotiation process is disambiguated with
abductive constraint logic programming (ACLP) and Event Calculus (EC).
Then we propose a policy ratification method based on a policy aggrega-
tion algebra that elaborate the request space and policy rule relation. This
method ensures that, when policies are aggregated due to resource sharing
and merging activities, the resulting policy correctly interprets the original
security goals of the providers’ policies.
1 Introduction
Recent years have seen the development of network-based, distributed and coop-
erative information systems paradigm, such as Web Service, Cloud Computing,
Collaborative Enterprise or Social Network settings. The major hallmark of secu-
rity engineering for such systems is to protect each organization’s autonomy and
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patrimony value while building a consistent multi-organizational business federa-
tion. Such an open-system paradigm introduces the needs to control accesses by
previous unknown users [1], probably identified with multiple attributes that re-
flect their security profiles [2, 3]. Besides, the cross-boundary asset sharing activ-
ities and risks associated to loss of governance [4] call for a continuous protection
covering the full lifecycle of assets, paying attention to the sharing and consum-
ing activities. Such requirements are beyond the expressivity of traditional access
control and, therefore, continuous ’due usage’-aware security policy models have
been visioned by the research community [5, 1, 6]. Summarized as Usage Control
[1], such a model extends traditional access control systems (where the decision
of policy negotiation process is usually the permission or negation of ’access’ ac-
tion) with necessary elements to express variable privileges upon the object and,
especially, obligations [7, 8] associated to the privileges. It allows providers to
define in what manner their assets are consumed and received research attentions
since its introduction [9, 10, 11].
In an open information systems paradigm, real-time context-awareness is vital
for the success of cooperation, therefore dynamic security attributes of partners are
considered in coalition. Usage control model has the agility to build authorization
condition on identity, role or attributes, thus settles security factors in various
system paradigms.
As in cooperative information systems partners’ interactions usually incur the
aggregation of their assets (we name it as ’O-Asset’ in the following discussion),
their policies are merged to regulate the further usage of the merged asset (denoted
as ’C-Asset’ in the following). Therefore a policy ratification process is usually
necessary to ensure that partners’ security policies are not conflicting. Aware of
such issues, this paper discusses the employment of attribute-based usage control
policy for compliance-assurance for partner behavior in a distributed cooperative
system:
• We use a concise syntax with EBNF to summarize the attribute-based usage
control policy model.
• We describe the semantics of negotiation process, with abductive constraint
logic programming (ACLP) and Event Calculus (EC) [12], to formulate the
mechanism for matching attribute predicates between requests and rules,
as well as the impact of rule/policy combining algorithms. Researchers
have described temporal constrains in usage control model, paying partic-
ular attention on ’right’ exertion [13], ’obligation’ [14] and ’attribute up-
dating’ [15] operations, with Temporal Logics (e.g. TLA). Our discussion,
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otherwise, focuses on formulating the request-policy matching mechanism,
which builds up the foundation for policy ratification mechanism.
• We propose a policy ratification method based on a policy aggregation alge-
bra to ensure that the resulting policy correctly interprets the original goals
of the providers’ policies. Very recently an integration algebra [16] has been
brought forward to capture the semantics of policy ratification w.r.t. the re-
quest space. Since its introduction, it has been employed by researchers
to articulate policy analysis processes. Our policy aggregation algebra is
also based on this algebra but an extension is made by our own perspec-
tive: we describe the logic foundation for policies from different security
domains to be correlated. This is based on the awareness that domain-
separation and lack of semantic coordination on elements in request spaces
hinder the policy conflicts detection and inconsistency resolution process,
due to semantic misunderstanding. Our ratification process combines poli-
cies with ’specificity precedence’ (i.e. rules applying to more specific entity
sets take precedence) principle and ’deny override’ (deny rules take prece-
dence) combinator. It also allows potential extension for weighted policy
combination, simply put: more important polices dominate. After conflic-
tion detection, a recommendation method based on ’majority precedence’ is
used to facilitate choosing more eligible partners from those having positive
aggregation results.
After discussing the background and related work for the development of
attribute-based usage control in section (2), we summarize the attribute-based
usage control model in section (3). The semantics of policy evaluation and ag-
gregation processes are presented in section (4) and (5).
2 Background and related work
Access control is an approach using explicit rule-based models to grant a right to
a subject for the accessing of an object [1], built around the academic perspective
of the access control matrix model [17]. Canonical access control models, e.g.
mandatory access control (MAC), discretionary access control (DAC) and role-
based access control (RBAC), are based on the organizational view and focus on
providing authorization for asset accessing in a closed system environment [1].
Such models traditionally use a single credential (identity, role, etc.) to identify a
system entity (e.g. subject, object, right, etc.).
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2.1 Usage control
The foundation of usage control system has been laid down by some pioneering
researches. In the UCONABC model [5, 1], access decision is based on not only
role (as in RBAC) or identity (as usually in Access Control List, MAC and DAC),
but on diverse attributes of subjects and objects. With the grant and exertion of a
usage right, multiple consumption actions (e.g. playing several songs) and obli-
gation actions (e.g. deleting data) can happen, during this process. The attributes
of the object (e.g. the amount of the ’not used’ objects) and subject (e.g. bal-
ance in her/his account) are constantly changing. The authors defined models for
attribute updating actions. Temporal constraints on usage actions and attribute
updating actions are also formulated [15].
The researches of Docomo Euro Lab and ETH Zurich propose taxonomy for
the usage control policy related factors, e.g. usage activities, context attributes
[18], obligations [19] etc. Their discussion about the mechanisms for inspecting
low-level usage activities [20, 21, 14, 22] is based on a holisthic viewpoint that
exams the state changes related to consumed assets. Policy breach is defined as the
status leading to information transference into unallowed descriptors, i.e. process,
file on the disk, socket, memory area, etc.
The usage control model is based on re-thinking the security policy with ’due
usage’ requirements. It involves improving traditional access control models by
enriching the granted rights to accommodate various consumption activities and
obligations [19, 20]. Conditions for accessing rights can be based on single-
credential (e.g. role) or multiple credentials (e.g. attributes). Our work follow
such principle and focus on the case of multiple credential-based ’due usage’ con-
trol scenarios. We also address the policy interaction and ratification problem
which has not been explicitly explored in classical policy models.
2.2 Attribute-based access control
Attribute-Based Access Control (’ABAC’ for short) policy model [23, 24, 25, 3].
Rules in an ABAC policy are built through combination of attribute predicates
with logical operators. One of the representative work is XACML [6] standard,
which defines a general purpose attributed-based access control language using
the XML syntax. Access decision is based on the status (described by attributes)
of object, subject, context and actions, as well as other information in the re-
quest context extracted by XQuery [26]. XML-based syntax makes it easy to
be coordinated with other XML technologies, (e.g. it uses functions standard-
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ized in XQuery and XPath [27] to build the attribute predicates), or processed
with XML-based tools, e.g. DOM, JDOM, SAC, etc. Attribute-Based Access
Control (’ABAC’ for short) policy model bases the access condition on multiple
credentials therefore is pertinent to network-based open system paradigms. Our
work is align with the ABAC policy model in that the multiple-credential condi-
tion approach in our policy model is inherited from ABAC. But our policy model
involves the method to resolve the issue of aggregating policies from different se-
curity domains, using ratification approach to avoid conflictions. To this end, we
give a brief survey on policy weaving and ratification research in the following.
2.3 Policy weaving & lifecycle management systems
A wide variety of asset access control systems for regulating assets propagation
in cooperative and decentralized context have been proposed recently. A common
feature of these systems is that the mechanisms for applying providers’ policies
upon the full lifecycle of assets must consider the impact of complex cooperative
context, including asset aggregation, propagation and dissemination. For exam-
ple, much research attention has been paid on the control of information dissem-
ination with policies [28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33]. The dissemination paths usually
form complex patterns as chain, tree [32] or graph [34]. Therefore approaches for
dissemination control are closely related to the features of application context, al-
lowing users to express the path their data can follow [35] and the usage restriction
upon the data [28]. In some circumstances (e.g. restricting event replay in pub-
lish/subscribe systems [29, 30]), filtration and distortion are needed to restrict the
access to some information. It can be seen that the central issue of dissemination
control is to cope with assets derivation and maintain the effects of originators’
policies.
2.4 Policy ratification
A fundamental problem for a system with multiple policies is to find out whether
a policy system meets the intention of policy authors (usually called policy ratifi-
cation [36] or policy safety analysis [37]). It mitigates the policy ’leakage’, where
rights are granted to subjects that should be unauthorized, or ’over approxima-
tion’, where subjects expected to obtain a right can actually never be authorized
by the policy set. The analysis tasks usually consist in:
• Coverage (or totality [38]), which is whether the policy covers the ’interest
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cases’ (the conventional criteria is all the possible access requests in the
system) [39] considered by the policy author. Example of this task is the
’policy effect query’ in the EXAM policy analysis system [37].
• Conflicts, which means that some requirements for a right can not be achieved
simultaneously [40, 37]. If these requirements are all deemed obligatory,
conflicts among them lead to inconsistency [38].
• Dominance, which refers to the circumstance where a rule adding to the
system does not affect the system behavior, due to that other rules override
(dominance) this rule. Then it’s usually called a ineffective [36] or redun-
dant [41] rule.
We discuss the method for detecting the relations of conflicts and dominance,
based on the argument that they occur only when there is policy overlapping,
i.e. several policies are defined on the same, or overlapped, set of entities. In our
policy model an entity is defined on a set of attributes. Therefore, overlapping de-
tection is based on comparing the attributes sets (of the same ’entity’ category, i.e.
subject, object, context, right, obligation or restriction) between policies. Cov-
erage analysis depends on not only the policy model, but also the capability of
vocabulary base for describing the application domain knowledge (our vocabu-
lary base organization will be discussed in future work).
The co-effect of overlapping rules is decided by the effect of each individual
rule and the way they are combined, e.g. using combinators to set precedence
among multiple rules. Methods for combining rules can be differentiated along
two dimensions:
• Specificity precedence [42], which means that a rule applying to a more spe-
cific entity set takes precedence. For example the file access policies in OS
as Windows, Linux, etc. In such systems, if a policy P1 defines that a group
of files are allowed to be read by a user U , but one file in the group is defined
by another policy P2 as not readable by U . Then P2 takes precedence.
• Effect precedence [43] decides the precedence among rules according to
their effects – deny or permit. Examples include:
– One effect takes precedence, for example deny override (deny rule
takes precedence) and permit override in XACML [6].
– Majority takes precedence, referring to that the effect (deny or permit)
receiving more ’vote’ (more rules with that effect) wins [43].
– Precedence by order, as the first applicable in XACML [6].
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– Consensus, which defines that all the rules should have the same ef-
fect to get a decision [16, 43]. For example [43] proposed weak-
consensus and strong-consensus strategies; the integration algebra in
[16] is based on the strong-consensus combining method.
Our aggregation algorithm follows the specificity precedence principle and
uses deny override combinator to aggregate policies from different providers,
based on the observation that only when approvals from all the providers of an ag-
gregated asset are obtained that a right can be granted. A recommendation method
based on majority precedence principle is proposed to facilitate the selection of
more suitable partners from those having positive policy ratification results.
3 Attribute-based usage control for cooperative com-
puting context
An attribute-based usage control for cooperative computing context will accom-
modate rights upon resource and affiliated obligation in its ’authorization’ com-
ponent and attributes concerning the subject, object and context in its ’condition’
component. This ensures a fine-grained control of resource usage and correspond-
ing condition. Furthermore, to maintain upper-stream providers’ security policy
during assets aggregation, policy lifecycles management and policy aggregation is
required for the ratification process of policies from multiple domains. Therefore,
we can summarize the attribute-based usage control scheme as following.
Definition 1 (attribute-based usage control Scheme). an attribute-based usage
control system is represented with a tuple:
ABUC = (O,Sh,Rt,S,Ct,Ob,Rn,P,V,Lc,G) (1)
where
• O (Objects) represents the asset(s) protected by policy.
• Sh (Stakeholder) represents the provider of an asset and associated policy.
• Rt (Rights) includes the privileges upon the asset defined by Sh.
• S (Subjects) represents the parties that can get rights on the assets.
• Ct (Context) represents the collaboration context status associated to the
system infrastructure, the environment and the business transaction.
7
• Ob (Obligations) includes the achievement that must be done by the subject
when it exerts the right.
• Rn (Restrictions) represents the attributes (from Ct set) associated to rights
or obligations to further confine in what circumstance they are carried out.
• P (Policy) is the policy definition. It builds deduction relations from a set of
predicates on attributes of O, S and Ct to a set of predicates on Rt or Ob.
• V (Vocabulary) is a knowledge base collecting the attributes and their value
ranges, according to application domain knowledge, that can be used by the
policy model.
• Lc (Lifecycle) is factors indicating the lifecycle of a policy, rule or predicate,
to define whether their effects only cover partners directly interacting with
the owner, or all downstream (indirect) consumers of the owner’s assets.
• G (Aggregation algebra) is the algebra used to combine the individual poli-
cies from each stakeholder, when their assets merge. The resulting policy
reflects the co-effect of original policies.
an attribute-based usage control system takes into account the attributes of the
assets, the consumers, the information system infrastructure and the collaboration
context. It enables multiple providers to co-define the policy upon the artifact (C-
Asset) of cooperative work. By tagging some (or all) rules in its policy with a
’lifecycle’ (Lc) factor, a provider defines which rules (or the whole policy) should
take effect beyond direct partner, in other words, during the full lifecycle of an
asset, even after it is merged with other assets. An algebra ensures that the policy
aggregation is consistent and represents the co-effect of original policies.
With this policy scheme, consumers use ’Quality of Protection’ (QoP) poli-
cies to express their predefined promises about the protections that they offer to
the assets. Therefore, QoP policies include consumers’ security profiles (repre-
sented by attributes) and the privileges they demand upon the assets. In this way, a
request generated from the QoP provides enriched information for the providers.
We use ’Requirements of Protection’ (RoP) policies to express the providers’ re-
quirements and evaluate the QoP with RoP. Both QoP and RoP comply with the
syntax we propose in the following.
3.1 A concise syntax
We define an abstract syntax to present the attribute-based usage control policy
model using EBNF (the version defined in ISO/IEC 14977).
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3.2 Basic syntax
An attribute-based usage control policy P is a logical combination of rules R.
P ::= [”¬”],R,{[”∧ ”|”∨ ”], [”¬”],R} (2)
A rule is defined as:
R ::= Rt,”∧ ”,Ob, [”∧ ”,Rn],”← ”,C; (3)
where:
• Rt (Rights) denotes the operations upon the asset defined by the provider.
• Ob (Obligations) defines the requirements (e.g. some operations) that the
consumers must achieve if they exert the rights.
• Rn (Restrictions) is attached to Rt or Ob to confine the run-time status re-
lated to their fulfillments.
• C (Condition) summarizes the requirements that must be satisfied in order
to grant rights to a consumer.
The Rt element of a rule can involve multiple rights (formula 4). Negative
symbol can be used, resulting in a negation rule.
Rt ::= ”Rt(”, [”¬”], [right],{[”∧ ”|”∨ ”], [”¬”],right},”)”; (4)
Ob ::= ”Ob(”, [”¬”],action,{[”∧ ”|”∨ ”], [”¬”],action}”)”; (5)
Rights and obligations can be refined with restriction, which gives more con-
fining information. An example of associating obligations to a granted right can
be: if read client data (a right) then delete acquired data (an obligation) in 10
days (a restriction).
Rights are released thanks to conditions related to either subject (consumer)
attributes (denoted as SAT ), object (asset) attributes (denoted as OAT ) or context
related attributes (denoted as CNAT ), as shown in the following formula:
C ::= [”¬”],SAT, [”∧ ”|”∨ ”],OAT, [”∧ ”|”∨ ”], [CNAT]; (6)
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where SAT , OAT and CNAT are the sets of predicates on attributes of subject,
object and context. They are defined in the following formulae:
SAT ::=”SAT (”, [”¬”],sub ject attribute name,operator,attribute value,
{[”∧ ”|”∨ ”], [”¬”],sub ject attribute name,operator,attribute value},”)”;
(7)
OAT ::=”OAT (”, [”¬”],ob ject attribute name,operator,attribute value,
{[”∧ ”|”∨ ”], [”¬”],ob ject attribute name,operator,attribute value},”)”;
(8)
CNAT ::= ”CNAT (”, [”¬”],context attribute name,operator,attribute value,
{[”∧ ”|”∨ ”], [”¬”],context attribute name,operator,attribute value},”)”;
(9)
Context attributes include the attributes of system infrastructure, environment
and business session. An example is organizationName = TechoInc.,where the
attribute name is organizationName, the operator is equalto and the attribute value
is TechoInc..
3.3 Rule lifecycle descriptors
Syntax elements Sh and Lc (see definition 1) are related to policy aggregation
process. Sh indicates the owner of a policy, it provides provenance information
after original policies are merged. The Lc can be attached to a policy or to a
specific attribute predicate in the policy to indicate the effect scope of the policy or
predicate. In cooperative systems, policies can take effect beyond direct partners
to protect assets providers’ intellectual properties in the outcome of cooperative
context. For example, by tagging a policy with Lc = eot (eot represents the end of
transaction), the provider stipulates that the policy should be respected during the
whole business process, by anyone that consumes an artifact containing the asset
associated to that policy. Those predicates that only take effect between direct
partners are attached with Lc = dp, where dp stands for ’directly communicated
partners’.
4 The negotiation process
The negotiation process is described based on Abductive Constraint Logic Pro-
gramming, obligations treated as condition, due to the observation that the fulfill-
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ment of obligations must be guaranteed before rights can be granted. The system
entities’ status changes induced by the grant or exertion of rights [44] and obliga-
tions [8] can be described by Event Calculus.
4.1 Request and Decision
A request is generated from consumer’s QoP. It declares the consumer’s attribute
(SAT), the attributes of the assets it demands (OAT), the context attributes (CNAT,
which includes the attributes of the infrastructure, the environment and the busi-
ness session), the rights it requires and the obligations it will align with. Our
policy should consider state changes of system entities. Therefore the temporal
information of the access-related actions, e.g. request generation, decision and re-
sponse of policy evaluation, enforcement of decision, etc., should all be recorded.
Such information is regulated as (events) attributes of the business session. They
are regulated in the policy model, as discussed in section (4.6).
req(Rt,QoPAC.SAT,QoPAC.OAT,QoPAC.CNAT,QoPAC.Ob, t) (10)
When a request is matched by a rule in the policy, the effect of the rule is
returned as a decision (usually the permit or deny of some rights). The decision
should also indicate the subjects, objects, obligations and restrictions. The fol-
lowing formula illustrates this process.
[¬]Authorize(Rt,S,O,Ob,Rn, t)← QoPAC ⊃Sa RoPAP (11)
In above formula, Rt, S, O, Ob, Rn, t stand for rights, subjects, objects, obli-
gations, restrictions and ’time’ respectively. It states that if the QoP of asset con-
sumer fulfills the RoP of asset provider, rights can be granted, if obligations are
imposed, and these rights can be followed by restrictions. Temporal factor t indi-
cates the time point when the negotiation decision is made and, therefore, will be
used to exam the temporal restrictions. The function ⊃Sa denotes that the QoPAC
matches the RoPAP. This involves matching a request with each rule and then
considering the effect of multi-rules related with a combinator.
4.2 Matching mechanism
The foundation for two attributes to match is that they are certified by issuers
trusted by each other, i.e. in one Certificate-Chain (CC). The formula (12) de-
scribes this semantic.
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∃CC : issuerAR ∈CC, issuerAQ ∈CC
issuerAR, issuerAQ |= True
(12)
In this formula and the following, the syntactic element AR stands for an at-
tribute in the rules, AQ for an attribute in the request. We use the notation con-
vention that for an element P, XP refers to a child element (or property) of P. So
issuerAR refers to the issuer of the AR. |= stands for the ’entailment’ relationship.
A |=L X means that X is provable from A for a language L. In other words, X is
a semantic consequence of a set of statements A under a deductive system that
is complete (all valid arguments are deducible – provable) and sound (no invalid
arguments is provable) for a language L. The formula (12) is necessary in a de-
centralized context (as a business federation) as the attributes of partners may be
issued (certified) by different issuers. Trust among these issuers is necessary for
the partners to acknowledge the status of each other.
The formula (13) asserts that if the attribute names (attr-id) of AR and AQ
are the same, they are in the same category (in other words, SAT can only match
with SAT , OAT with OAT , and so on), their types (that is, data type of the at-
tribute value) are the same and they are issued by trusted issuers, the AR and AQ
can match each other, depending on the predicate function f cnM of AR and the
attribute value AV provided by AQ, that is, if the attribute value provided by the
request is in the attribute value range defined by the rule.
attr-idAR = attr-idAQ ∧ catAR = catAQ ∧ typeAR = typeAQ
∀issuerAR, issuerAQ : issuerAR, issuerAQ |= True
AR,AQ |=m AVAQ (13)
The formula (14) states that for an attribute predicate M, if its attribute name
AR is matched by an attribute name AQ in the request Q and the AV of AQ satisfies
f cnM(AVM) (that is, in the range of value defined by the predicate function f cnM
and attribute value in AR), M is matched by the Q.
∃AR ∈M : AR,Q |=m AVAQ
f cnM(AVM,AVAQ) = True
M,Q |= True (14)
The formula (15) describes the matching between a rule R and a request Q: if
all attribute predicates Ms in R are matched by Q, the access decision is provided
by the effect of the rule, i.e. E f f ectR.
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∀MR : MR,Q |= True
R,Q |= E f f ectR (15)
4.3 Obligation
Obligations are deemed as constraints for future execution behavior of the system
[45]. The promise of obligation can be seen as a pre-condition for granting rights:
grant(R)← f ul f ill(C)∧ promise(Ob). The negotiation process must also evalu-
ate potential conflicts between the obligations in request (AQ in formula 16) with
authorizations in the policy (AR in formula 16):
∃MRt ∈ RtR,AR ∈MRt ,AQ ∈ ObQ :
AR,ObQ |=m AVAQ f cnM(AVM,AVAQ) = False
RtR,ObQ |= False
(16)
4.4 Rule combinator
In situations where a request is matched by multiple rules, especially both per-
mit rules and deny rules, a combinator [46, 43, 47, 38] is required to solve the
conflicts. We use the deny-override combinator (in short, a request is always de-
nied as soon as it matches a deny rule) [6] to get a stringent control strategy. By
giving deny rules precedence, we get a more restrictive policy model, in order
to avoid the unintentional rights granting due to that a slipshod permit rules takes
precedent over the well-defined rules. Moreover, this strategy can be coupled with
the ’negation as failure’ principle to build a multi-layered effect space that allows
fine-grained policy authoring (as illustrated in figure 1).
Deny by 
default
Permit by 
permit rules
Deny by 
deny rules
Figure 1: Partition of requests domain with multi-layered effects
The formula (17) describes the evaluation of multiple rules coordinated by
combinator. In the following formulae, the ε stands for the effect of rule (’deny’
in our policy model), P the policy combining several ([1,n]) rules R. A P with
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ε-Overrides combinator is evaluated to effect ε if among all the rules Rs that
match Q, there are at least one rule R with ε effect.
∃i ∈ [1,n] : Ri,Q |= ε
(P ε-Overrides R1, ...,Rn),Q |= ε (17)
The formula (18) asserts: The P with ε-Overrides combinator is evaluated to
Indeterminate if no R with ε effect has matched Q and, at the same time, there is
at least one R that evaluates Indeterminate with Q.
∀R : R,Q 6|= E f f ectR = ε
∃ j ∈ [1,n] : R j,Q |=
Indeterminate
(P ε-Overrides R1, ...,Rn),Q |= Indeterminate (18)
The formulae (19) asserts: The P with ε-Overrides combinator is evaluated to
the opposite effect of ε (denoted as ε), if among all the Rs that match Q, there is
at least one rule R with ε effect, no R with ε effect and, at the same time, all the
Rs that match Q as Indeterminate must have effect of ε.
∃i : Ri,Q |= ε
∀ j : R j,Q 6|= ε
∀R : R,Q 6|= Indeterminate∨E f f ectR = ε
(P ε-Overrides R1, ...,Rn),Q |= ε (19)
The formula (20) asserts: The P with ε-Overrides combinator is evaluated to
NotApplicable if no R matches Q.
∀ j : R j,Q 6|= ε
∀ j : R j,Q 6|= ε
∀ j : R j,Q 6|= Indeterminate
(P ε-Overrides R1, ...,Rn),Q |= NotApplicable (20)
According to the ’negation as failure’ (close policy) principle in our model,
the Indeterminate and NotApplicable evaluation results can be flattened to Deny
effect. But at implementation level, Indeterminate results require usually com-
pensation mechanisms, e.g. ’certificate discovery’ processes to try finding the
required information.
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4.5 Response
A response can either deny or grant rights with some obligations and restrictions.
In some situations, the asset attributes OAT and the context attributes CNAT can
be modified.
[¬]Authorize(Rt,S,OAT,CNAT,Ob,Rn,T) (21)
4.6 State regulation
When the consumer exerts the granted rights, the usage event (e.g. the assets
consumption activities) usually leads to the system status changes (as the ’attribute
updates’ discussed in UCONABC model). Such events should be considered in
policy definitions, e.g. for the sake of ’model conflict detection’. We collect such
events as ’business session attributes’, which is part of the CNAT (CNAT consists
in status information concerning the IT infrastructure, environment and business
session, see section 3.2). Some attributes are dynamic (e.g. usage events, business
session events or environment factors), whereas others (e.g. the infrastructure
information) are relatively ’static’ in the sense that they are not related to the
usage or any other dynamic event that occurs in the business session context. The
dynamic attributes in CNAT can be described by event calculus [44].
For an incoming request, the context attributes set CNAT includes the asset
consumer’s state information concerning its fulfillment of the rights (and associ-
ated obligations) granted to it before. As these context factors are related to the
individual consumer, we denote them as CNATind .
There are also other ’public’ contextual information that is not related only to
one partner but rather to all the parters, concerning the state of the collaboration
context as a whole. We denote this as CNATpub.
Thus we have:
CNAT =CNATind ∪CNATpub (22)
The following formulae (23)-(27) define five types of CNATind statements.
permitted (Rt,Sub,Ob, t) (23)
denied (Rt,Sub,Ob, t) (24)
obliged (Act,Sub,Ob, ts, te, t) (25)
f ul f illed (Act,Sub,Ob, tinit, ts, te, t) (26)
violated (Act,Sub,Ob, tinit, t) (27)
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where Act is the set of actions and there is: Act ⊑ Ob, Act ⊑ Rt. Sub is the
subject, Ob the object(s). Factor t is the time point when the permission (formula
23), negation (formula 24) or obligation (formula 25) is imposed. The ts and te
are the start time and the end time of the obligation respectively. The tinit is the
time point when the fulfillment or violation of the obligation happes. It can be
seen that these CNATind formulae express the system events that are regulated by
policy, i.e. the events of authorizations (rights or obligations) and the fulfillment
or violation of them.
Formulae (28)-(30) define three types of CNATpub statements.
happens (event) (28)
holdsAt (event) (29)
broken (event) (30)
They express events that are not managed by policy, e.g. events in business
context as partner joining and quitting, session initiation, session termination, etc.,
or environmental events as changes of location, time, temperature, etc. Attribute-
based usage control systems should be aware of state changes in the cooperative
context caused by these events, as such changes lead to system entities’ attribute
updates.
Above semantics describes our policy evaluation process, which is aware of
the context status. The following section describes a policy ratification process,
which ensures that, when multiple policies are aggregated, the resulting policy
represents the security goals of original policies.
5 The ratification process
This section presents a ratification method (the semantics represented by an ag-
gregation algebra), including conflicts detection and recommendation generation
process, for policies from different security domains.
5.1 An aggregation algebra
As multi-policy ratification process is based on repeated peer-to-peer policy ag-
gregation, therefore we first focus on the way that two policies are aggregated and
use an aggregation algebra to formulate it.
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Definition 2 (Aggregation Algebra). The aggregation algebra for cooperative
policy is represented by a tuple:
(P,Σ,Πdc,&) (31)
where P is a set of policies, Σ the vocabulary base consisting in the attribute
names and value domains that the policies are defined on, Πdc a unary operation
of domain projection, & a binary intersection operation.
Our aggregation algebra is based on extensions of a fine-grained policy inte-
gration algebra [16]:
• The semantics of Σ and Πdc are extended to multiple-owner policies aggre-
gation.
• & has been modified to apply ’strong consensus’ to achieve ’originator con-
trol’ [48].
Some definitions describe the basic concepts used in our policy scheme:
Definition 3 (Access request). Let a1,a2, ...ak be a set of attribute names and
dom(ai)(1 ≤ i ≤ k) the domain of possible value of ai, let vi ∈ dom(ai). Q ≡
{(a1,v1),(a2,v2), ...,(ak,vk)} is a request over Σ. The set of all requests over Σ is
denoted as QΣ.
Definition 4 (3-valued access control model). A 3-valued access control policy P
is a function mapping each request Q to a value in {Y,N,NA}. The Y , N and NA
stand for Permit, Deny and NotApplicable decisions respectively. QPY , QPN and
QPNA denote the set of permitted, denied and not applicable requests by the P-based
evaluation. QΣP = QPY ∪QPN ∪QPNA, QPY ∪QPN = φ, QPY ∪QPNA = φ, QPN ∪QPNA = φ
(ensured by the ’deny-override’ combinator in our basic policy model).
Although access control system usually possess a 4-valued model [46, 6]
(i.e. including Permit, Deny, NotApplicable and Indeterminate, more discus-
sion on the effects of 4-valued policy model can be found in [46]), we can deem
Indeterminate as NotApplicable at policy model level discussion, as our policy
scheme uses ’negation as failure’ principle and any request that is not explicitly
permitted is denied.
Definition 5 (Domain constraint). A domain constraint dc takes the form of
(a1,range1),(a2,range2), ...,(an,rangen), where a1,a2, ...,an are attribute names
on Σ, and rangei(1 ≤ i ≤ n) is a set of values in dom(ai). Given a request r =
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(ar1,vr1), ...,(arm,vrm), we say that r satisfies dc if the following condition holds:
for each (ar j ,vr j) ∈ r(1≤ j ≤ m) there exists (ai,rangei) ∈ dc, such that ar j = ai
and vr j ∈ rangei.
Domain projection (Πdc): This operator takes the domain constraint dc as a
parameter to restrict a policy to the set of requests identified by dc (see formula
32). Consequently, the domain projection operator Πdc delimits a set of attribute
names and their corresponding value ranges. In a cooperative context such delim-
itation is necessary as partners from different organizations must share application
domain vocabulary.
PI = Πdc(P)⇔
{ QPIY = {r|r ∈ QPY and r satisfies dc}
QPIN = {r|r ∈ QPN and r satisfies dc}
(32)
The domain constraint means that when two policies are integrated, their vo-
cabularies must comply with each other, precisely:
PI = P1&P2 ⇐ (Πdc(P1)⊆Πdc(2))∪ (Πdc(P2)⊆Πdc(P1)) (33)
where intersection (&) is defined by formula (34):
PI = P1&P2 ⇔


QPIY = QP1Y ∩QP2Y
QPIN = QP1N ∪QP2N
QPINA = QP1Y ∩QP2NA∪QP1NA∩QP2Y
(34)
Given two policies P1 and P2, the intersection operation returns a policy PI
which is applicable to all requests having the same decisions from P1 and P2. That
is, PI permits (denoted as QY ) the requests that are permitted by P1 and P2 at the
same time. It denies (denoted as QN) the requests that are denied by P1 and P2
at the same time. For all other cases, PI returns not applicable (denoted as QNA)
decision.
With the ’negation as failure’ principle, we can further flatten the 3-valued
algebra to the effects of Permit and Deny, as all the NotApplicable decisions
result in the Deny effect:
PI = P1&P2 ⇔
{ QPIY = QP1Y ∩QP2Y
QPIN = QP1N ∪QP2N ∪QP1NA∪QP2NA
(35)
This aggregation algebra is more explicit and reduces the complexity of ag-
gregation algorithm design, as a request is permitted only when both providers
permit it (i.e. when QP1Y ∩QP2Y 6= φ). All other situations lead to the deny decision.
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This aggregation algebra is based on the request space and articulates our pol-
icy aggregation model. But during aggregation operations, directly comparing the
request spaces of two policies is untractable, as enumerating all requests that can
be accepted by a policy is not possible if some attributes predicates in the pol-
icy have unbounded value space (e.g. attributes defined on time, numeric ranges,
etc.).
A request can be seen as a vector of attribute predicates. Therefore a natural
switchover is to directly compare the attribute predicates. This allows to analyze
the relations between the request spaces they cover, in order to get answers for
questions like, e.g., ”Does any request that is permitted by both of these policies
exist?”. Such thoughts lead to the study of relations between policy elements,
namely ’rule similarity’ analysis, which in turn is decided by the relations between
attribute predicates in the rules.
5.2 Relations between attribute predicates
For two attribute predicates of the same category (i.e. subject, object, etc.), several
relations can be identified.
• Contradict predicates: predicates on the same attribute with disjunctive
value domains (see formula 36 for a natural deduction rule expression of
it).
∀AR1 ∈M1,AR2 ∈M2 : catAR1 |= catAR2 ∧attr-idAR1 = attr-idAR2
¬∃AVx : f cnM1(AVAR1,AVx) = True∧ f cnM2(AVAR2,AVx) = True
M1,M2 |= False
(36)
For example, two attribute predicates lastAccess> 10days and lastAccess<
3days are contradictable, as they define two value ranges [10,∞) and [0,3]
which have no intersection, upon the same attribute lastAccess. Therefore,
when aggregating two positive rules R1 and R2, given that QR1Y 6= φ and
QR2Y 6= φ, we have QR1Y ∩QR2Y = φ only when R1 and R2 have contradictable
attribute predicates.
• Distinct predicates: attribute predicates that exist in only one rule (we omit
the natural deduction rule expressions of this case and those following).
• Common predicates: predicates existing in all the rules to be compared.
• Restricting predicates: if two attribute predicates M1 and M2 (from dif-
ferent rules) have the same attribute name and the value range of M1 is a
subset of the value range of M2, they form a pair of restricting predicates
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and M2 is restricted by M1. For example lastAccess < 90days is restricted
by lastAccess < 10days.
• Intersecting predicates: two attribute predicates (from different rules) that
have the same attribute name, with different but intersected value ranges.
An example of this case is: lastAccess < 10days and lastAccess > 3days.
5.3 Rule similarity
According to the aggregation algebra, when aggregating two providers’ policies,
we focus on two problems:
• finding out if there exists any request that can be permitted by both providers,
according to the permit rules in their policies;
• when such requests exist, finding out if they are all overridden by the deny
rules of these two providers (in this case, no request can be permitted).
To find out the co-effect of rules, we define rule similarity according to a
’request space’ viewpoint and summarize the following types of rule relation.
• Disjoint: If two rules have contradict predicates, their request spaces can
never overlap. Therefore they are related by the disjoint relation, which
means that no request can match both of them.
• Conjoint: If two rules have only common predicates, they cover the same
request space. Therefore they are related by the conjoint relation. A request
matching one of them matches also the other.
• Cover: For two rules R1 and R2, ’R1 covers R2’ means that all requests
matching R2 also match R1. In other words, R1 covers the request space
of R2. This occurs when R2 restricts the value range of attributes in R1,
or when R2 extends R1 with new attributes. Consequently, we can identify
three cases leading to the cover relation:
– R2 restricts R1: each predicate in R1 is restricted by a counterpart in
R2.
– R2 refines R1: each predicate in R1 has a counterpart in R2 (with ’com-
mon predicate’ relation) and, in addition, R2 has some distinct predi-
cates.
– R2 may both restrict and refine R1 at the same time.
• Overlap: All other situations lead to overlap relation between the request
spaces of two rules, which includes:
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– When there are intersecting predicates between the two rules. Because
that in such situation none of them can cover the request space of the
other defined on the attribute value domain of the intersecting predi-
cates.
– When both rules have distinct predicates (similar to above case, as
none of them can cover the request space of the other associated to the
distinct predicates).
– When some predicates in a rule R1 restrict predicates in rule R2 and,
at the same time, some predicates in R2 restrict predicates in R1.
– The combination of the former 3 cases (all of the 3 cases can co-exist
between two rules).
Rule similarity relations have direct impact on the aggregation process of poli-
cies that have multiple rules. For example, if there are ’disjoint’ relations between
two permit rules, the aggregation result can be matched by no request. Besides, a
permit rule is ’covered’ by a deny rule, the aggregation result of them will permit
no request. The following section gives detailed discussion about aggregation.
5.4 Aggregation algorithm
The aggregation process produces a ’Context Security Policy’ (CSP), which con-
sists in two sub-policy sets, RoPCSP and QoPCSP. The RoPCSP (see formula 37)
represents the requirements of the providers (AP in formula 37) whose assets are
composed into the artifact of cooperative business process. It’s defined as a com-
bination of RoP′AP which represents their policy elements (policy, assertion or at-
tribute predicates) that are refined with the Lc indicator. The QoPCSP combines the
QoPP (see formula 38) of all the participants. It represents the context’s guarantee
about future participants’ policies.
RoPCSP =
m
∑
i=1
(RoPCSP⊎RoP′APi) (37)
QoPCSP =
n
∑
i=1
(QoPCSP⊎QoPPi) (38)
In formulae (37) and (38):
• Factor m is the total number of asset providers in the collaboration context.
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• Factor n is the total number of partners (providers and consumers) in the
collaboration context.
• Operator ⊎ represents the aggregation function that uses the ’aggregation
algebra’ to aggregate two sets of policies.
• Aggregated policies RoPCSP and QoPCSP are empty sets at the beginning.
We discuss the aggregation function in the following, paying attention to ’con-
flict’ detection.
5.4.1 Aggregation of permit rules
In order to integrate two permit rules, we have to pay attention to the rights pred-
icates. Two permit rules can only be aggregated when they have overlapping
’rights’ element, i.e. there are some rights which exist in both rules. If two permit
rules, from different asset providers, define totally different rights, we call them
irrelevant permit rules. In such case, policy aggregation fails. Because that with
’negation as failure’ and ’originator control’ principles, a right upon a C-Asset is
permitted only when all the providers permit it.
When the permit rules have overlapping ’rights’ element, we have to check
whether they are ’disjoint’ rules (i.e. whether there are ’contradict predicates’
between them, as ’contradict predicates’ mean that no request can match both of
rules).
When two rules are ’irrelevant’ or ’disjoint’, there is a conflict of incompat-
ible permit rules. Otherwise, the two permit rules are compatible and can be
aggregated. In this case, all ’distinct predicates’ and ’common predicates’ be-
tween them are added to the CSP policy. For a pair of ’intersecting predicates’
or ’restricting predicates’, the new value range is computed as the value range
intersection of the two predicates in the pair.
This procedure describes the basic aggregation process for two policies both
having only one permit rule. When aggregating two policies both having multiple
permit rules, the aggregation process will form a series of permit rule pairs by
selecting one rule from each policy. Then for each rules pair, it checks whether
there is a conflict of incompatible permit rules. If all the rules pairs have such a
conflict, the aggregation fails. Otherwise, compatible rule pairs are integrated to
the resulting CSP policy.
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5.4.2 Aggregating policies with deny rules
When there are deny rules in the policies that are aggregated, the potential of
conflict increases. For example if all permit rules are ’covered’ (or ’overridden’
as defined in XACML) by deny rules, the resulting policy can not authorize any
access request. Generally, there are 2 types of conflict brought by deny rules in
our policy models:
• Positive-Negative Conflict of Modalities: It occurs when a subject is both
authorized and prohibited for a right on an object. As we use deny-override
combinator (see section 4.4), a permit rule covered by a deny rule is inef-
fective (its effect is overridden by the deny rule). Therefore when aggregat-
ing two policies, after processing all the ’compatible permit rule’ pairs, we
should check if all the resulting rules generated from aggregating compat-
ible rules are covered by some deny rules. In such case, the resulting CSP
policy will not authorize any access request and the aggregation fails.
• Conflict between Imperial and Authority Policies: It occurs when a sub-
ject is required to carry out an action by the ’obligation’ of a policy and is
prohibited to carry out this action by another policy. If this happens during
the aggregation of policies from different partners, it means that the part-
ners have contradictable security policies. Consequently they should not be
gathered in one collaboration context. When the conflict occurs between
policies belonging to a single owner, it denotes the inconsistent policy au-
thoring work. As a consequence, its correction is left to the policy owner
system, e.g. relying on policy ratification [36] or policy safety analysis [37]
systems.
5.4.3 Other conflicts
Some other types of conflict in a cooperative context should be handled, not by
the aggregation process itself, but by other methods. We give a brief discussion of
them:
• Conflict of Duties: It indicates the cases where two actions are not allowed
to be performed by the same subject, e.g. by the ’separation of duties’ prin-
ciple [49]. Usually the policy author applies this principle by introducing a
deny rule to its policy set to forbid some actions based on the past actions of
the subject. This historical action information is deemed as attributes of the
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subject, in our policy model, and is provided by session events (including
usage activities) collected by the policy enforcement system.
• Conflict of Interests: It means that a subject is not allowed to perform the
same action upon two objects. This is handled with the same approach as
the ’conflict of duties’. The owner of the object has just to define a deny
rule to express this principle.
• Conflict of Priorities for Resources: It happens when more than one exclu-
sive usage requests are made to a resource, or when the resource is associ-
ated to a limited amount, which is exceeded by the total amount demanded
by all the requests. The ’pre-update’ strategy of attribute management in
UCONABC [1] can ensure that such conflict is avoided. This strategy allows
the attributes of subject and object (and any other related entity, if needed)
to be updated by the access control system immediately after the right is
granted and before it is exerted.
When more than one partner can be chosen to join the collaboration context
and if none of them has a policy that conflicts with the CSP, a ’general majority
voting’ strategy like those in [46] can be used to choose the most fitting partner
w.r.t. security perspective, as introduced in the following.
5.4.4 Aggregation recommendation
From the aggregation algebra and the aggregation algorithm given previously, we
can see that the CSP becomes more restrictive when aggregating new partners
policies: rights upon the C-Asset decrease, whereas the condition expends. Con-
sequently, the chance to find eligible future participants diminishes. We propose
a partner recommendation method as a countermeasure. Basically, if more than
one partner can be chosen to join the context ( fitting to the business goal and
security requirements of the context), the partner with the more suitable secu-
rity profile is chosen, according to a ’weighted majority voting’ principle, based
on extending the ’Majority Voting’ [46] method. ’Weighted’ is due to the fact
that we give more importance to RoP of the partner than to the QoP, and for
comparing RoP policies, the importance among rule elements is weighted as:
condition > rights > restriction > obligation.
Therefore, we exam policies according to the following priority:
• Slim RoP, which favors the partners that introduce less restricts to the CSP,
thus allowing more opportunities for new consumers in the future step. A
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’Slimmer’ RoP is decided with the following priority among policy ele-
ments:
1 Slim condition element, which has fewer attribute predicates that have
wider value ranges. With fewer predicates, a rule defines a less spe-
cific (wider) range of entities (entities can be subject, object, context,
environment, etc.), allowing the rule to match more requests (e.g. it’s
easier to match a rule with 5 attribute predicates than to match a rule
with 50 attribute predicates). A wider value range of an attribute pred-
icate covers a larger scope in the value domain. Thus it’s easier for
the request to fall in (match with) the range (e.g. age⊂ [1,15] covers
a larger request space than age ⊂ [1,3]). The condition element has
three components: subject, object and context. Each of them can have
several attribute predicates, which can be further weighted. But the
weight on a specific set of attributes is closely related to the domain of
application and also depends on the policy author’s goal. Therefore it
should be left to be customized by users of the policy implementation
system.
2 Rich rights element, which has more rights or the rights that give ’more
usage opportunity’ (closely depending on the application domain).
3 Slim restrictions element, similar to the condition element.
4 Slim obligations element, similar to the condition element.
• Rich QoP, which favors the partners that make the aggregated CSP have
slim rights element and rich condition, restrictions and obligations ele-
ments. It increases the chance to fit to RoP policies for the future steps.
The rational of these principles is to ”slow down” the growth of the RoPCSP
and the reduction of QoPCSP. The principles we’ve defined steer the combination
of policies in a single step. To optimize the aggregated CSP on the global scale
of cooperative context (which involves multiple steps), the method presented in
[37] can be used. In this system a policy is represented by a Multi-Terminal Bi-
nary Decision Diagram (MTBDD). Combining multiple policies means combin-
ing MTBBDs to form a Combined MTBDD (CMTBDD). As each CMTBDD rep-
resents an aggregation in our policy scheme, aggregation recommendation can be
done by using state-of-the-art optimization methods to choose the best CMTBDD
with our recommendation principle (slim RoP and rich QoP).
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6 Conclusion
Attribute-based usage control policy model provides fine-grained control of re-
source access condition and continuous regulation of partners’ behavior. With
policy ratification and aggregation mechanism, it forms a foundation for security
configuration of cooperative computing context. The paper describes an attribute-
based usage control policy scheme, providing a concise syntax with EBNF and
discussed the negotiation and aggregation processes.
The negotiation process is described based on Abductive Constraint Logic
Programming, disambiguating the request-policy fulfillment relation by elaborat-
ing the attribute matching mechanism and effects of rule combinator.
The policy ratification process supports specificity precedence principle and
deny override combinator to ensure that the resulting policy represents the co-
effect of original policies. Basically, an access request to an C-Asset (artifact of
the cooperative business process) is refused if any provider of resources (denoted
as O-Assets) involved in the C-Asset refuses the request. An aggregation algebra
is developed to describe the semantics of aggregation process, based on modifica-
tion and extension of a previous policy integration algebra [16]. We give further
discussion of attribute predicates relations and rule similarities, which have direct
impacts on the policy aggregation method. A majority voting strategy is proposed
to recommend partners with preferable security profiles.
Future work consists in the development of security governance framework
based on the policy scheme, taking into consideration the impacts of complex
cooperative contexts and particular IT infrastructures.
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